Forensic Acquisition of IMVU: A Case Study by van Voorst, Robert et al.
Journal of Digital Forensics, 
Security and Law 
Volume 10 Number 4 Article 6 
2015 
Forensic Acquisition of IMVU: A Case Study 
Robert van Voorst 
National Police of the Netherlands 
M-Tahar Kechadi 
University College Dublin 
Nhien-An Le-Khac 
University College Dublin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/jdfsl 
 Part of the Computer Engineering Commons, Computer Law Commons, Electrical and Computer 
Engineering Commons, Forensic Science and Technology Commons, and the Information Security 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
van Voorst, Robert; Kechadi, M-Tahar; and Le-Khac, Nhien-An (2015) "Forensic Acquisition of IMVU: A 
Case Study," Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law: Vol. 10 : No. 4 , Article 6. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jdfsl.2015.1212 
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/jdfsl/vol10/iss4/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Digital Forensics, 
Security and Law by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please 
contact commons@erau.edu. 
(c)ADFSL 
Forensic Acquisition of IMVU: A Case Study JDFSL V10N4
© 2015 ADFSL Page 69
FORENSIC ACQUISITION OF IMVU: A CASE
STUDY
Robert van Voorst
National Police of the Netherlands
Rotterdam, Netherlands
rvanvoorst@politie-rijnmond.nl
M-Tahar Kechadi, Nhien-An Le-Khac
University College Dublin
Dublin 4, Ireland
{tahar.kechadi,an.lekhac}@ucd.ie
ABSTRACT
There are many applications available for personal computers and mobile devices that facilitate
users in meeting potential partners. There is, however, a risk associated with the level of
anonymity on using instant message applications, because there exists the potential for predators
to attract and lure vulnerable users. Today Instant Messaging within a Virtual Universe (IMVU)
combines custom avatars, chat or instant message (IM), community, content creation, commerce,
and anonymity. IMVU is also being exploited by criminals to commit a wide variety of offenses.
However, there are very few researches on digital forensic acquisition of IMVU applications. In
this paper, we discuss first of all on challenges of IMVU forensics. We present a forensic
acquisition of an IMVU 3D application as a case study. We also describe and analyse our
experiments with this application.
Keywords: Instant messaging, forensic acquisition, Virtual Universe 3D, forensic process, forensic
case study
INTRODUCTION
Instant messaging (IM) is one of the most
popular digital communication technologies
and is widely used today. In fact, IM belongs
to the category of Internet based
communication services. Traditionally the IM
was designed to transfer text messages only,
but now it has been enhanced with additional
features such as voice/video message, file
transfer, etc. Moreover, IM can be accessible
through cell phones or other mobile devices, as
well as on a computer. It is estimated that
there are several millions of IM users who use
IM for various purposes. There are numerous
IM applications available for download today
[1]. Besides, IM applications (apps) also allow
users to create a detailed personal profile
including name, email address, age, home
address, phone number, school and hobbies. If
users do not verify carefully during the sign-up
process, they could reveal more information
than they should. Easy accessible profiles can
allow anyone to contact IM users. Indeed,
some IM apps offer users the option of joining
in chat with strangers. As a consequence, using
of IM apps can encourage gossiping and
bullying. Children could receive pornographic
"spam" through IM apps or become victim of
Sexual grooming of children [2]. In the recent
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years, police investigators have noticed that
IM apps have been directly or indirectly
involved in criminal activities. Due to their
popularity, IM apps have the potential of
being a rich source of evidential value in all
kinds of criminal investigations. Indeed,
Europol has identified the threat of misused
IM communications by criminals to facilitate
their illegal activities due to the fact that it is
harder to monitor or to regulate these services
[3].
On the other hand, a virtual universe is a
computer-based simulated environment. In a
3D virtual universe, the users can take the
form of 3D avatars (virtual character) visible
to others. Today, Instant Messaging within a
Virtual Universe (IMVU) combines custom
avatars, chat/IM, community, content
creation, commerce, and anonymity [4]. IMVU
contains its own economy with a currency
system based on IMVU "credits" and
"promotional credits". IMVU members use the
credits to purchase virtual items like fashion
pieces (hair, clothes, skins, and accessories),
pets, and 3D scenes such as homes, clubs and
open landscapes. Except ‘VIP users’, everyone
has “Guest_” in front of his/her avatar name.
It is also possible to buy an ‘Access Pass’. The
Access Pass is available for those 18 years old
and older. It grants access to more risqué
clothing and slightly more intimate furniture
and poses. It also allows chatting to adults
only. IMVU was also mentioned as a common
Virtual World addressing ‘Crime and Policing
in Virtual Worlds’ (2010) by Marc Goodman
[5]. He concludes that criminals can exploit
this new technology to commit a wide variety
of offenses. Almost any types of crime in the
real world can also be found in virtual spaces
from child abuse to terrorist attacks. Besides,
the presence of child pornography in chat has
also been denounced in 3D social networks like
IMVU. Indeed, the emerging of 3D social
networks is rapidly tainted with child
pornography as stated in [6].
In fact, there are many tools available for
collecting artefacts, some of them specific for
chat/IM such as Paraben chat examiner [7] or
Belkasoft Evidence Centre 2015 [8]. However,
at the time of writing this paper, none of them
supports the investigation of IMVU apps.
Despite that IMVU exists a while, has millions
of users worldwide and it is associated with
child abuse (material), to the best of our
knowledge there is no technique or software
tool for forensic acquisition and analysis of
IMVU artefacts. Therefore, the objective of
this paper is to investigate whether it is
possible to forensically acquire and analyse
artefacts on a computer after the installation
and use of the IMVU application. The rest of
this paper is structured as follows: Section 2
shows the background of this research
including related work in this domain. We
present IMVU apps and forensic process in
Section 3. We describe our case study in
Section 4 and discuss on experiment results in
Section 5 and 6. We conclude and discuss on
future work in Section 7.
RELATED WORK
In fact, we have tried to find in literature
about this specific subject, but to the best of
our knowledge, there is no published research
regarding forensic artefacts of IMVU. Hence,
we present some literature survey on the
forensic acquisition and analysis of IM
applications in general. A more traditional
investigation method of IM has been described
in [9]. Kiley et al [10] conducted some research
on IM forensic artefacts and they also pointed
out that IM is being exploited by criminals due
to its popularity and privacy features. One of
the conclusions from this work is that forensic
evidence is recoverable after these programs
have been used, but investigators must know
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certain elements of the conversations in order
to perform string searches.
Lun [11] describes the popularity of IMs
and the challenges by extracting information
from these IMs by Law Enforcement. His
finding indicated that the forensic tool was
able to aid the forensic examiner to extract
digital evidence from instant messenger, but it
was not comprehensive enough at that forensic
examiners could not rely on one tool during an
investigation.
Dickson [12] describes the examination of
AOL Instant Messenger (AIM) 5.5. This
research focuses on the contact information
(identification) and the ability to trace back
from a known suspect’s computer system to
identify contact with his alleged victims. This
is specifically interesting when an allegation of
grooming is made. According to the author,
one of the first things an examiner should do is
to determine the suspect’s computer system
that was used to contact the informant’s
account in the first place.
Husain et al. [13] describe the Forensic
Analysis of Instant Messaging on Smart
Phones. Their results have shown that various
useful artefacts, related to IMs, can be
recovered, including username, password,
buddy list, last log-in time, and conversation
timestamp as well as conversation details.
In [14], authors observed that the relevant
research on the topic of evidence collection
from IM services was limited. Authors
presented the forensic acquisition and analysis
of WhatsApp, Viber, Skype and Tango IMs
and VoIPs for both iOS and Android platforms
and authors tried to answer on how evidence
can be collected when IM communications are
used. This work provides useful information
that assists us in developing our case study in
this paper. More precisely the authors have
provided a very useful taxonomy of target
artefacts.
IMVU AND FORENSIC
PROCESS
In this section, we describe our forensic process
for investigating IMVU apps for Windows. The
objective of this paper is to forensically
examine significant artefacts present on a
computer after the installation and use of the
IMVU app. Therefore, the approach chosen is
empirical or experimental research and
differential forensic analysis. While there is no
available technique or software tool to evaluate
and there is very little known about IMVU
artefacts, our approach includes the collection
of data during experiments and try to discover
significant forensic artefacts by observing and
analysing the data. In fact, with an IMVU
app, apart from the typical conversation log
showing on screen, and possible (log) files
saved on the logical drive, evidence of
conversation could also be found in page files
and unallocated hard disk space, the windows
registry or volatile data in the internal memory
(RAM). There are two main steps in our
forensic process: data collection and data
analysis.
IMVU data collection: in this phase data is
collected during the running time of an IMVU
app. The contents of the IMVU application
and data directory, unallocated disk space, the
Windows registry, volatile data from the
internal memory and network traffic are
acquired. We attempt moreover to infer the
behaviour of the IMVU application through
the reverse engineering process. The objective
is to trace user activities, like the history of
performed activities such as instant messages
sent or received (chat logs), date and time
stamp of the communication, sender, receiver
and password. All experiments were carried
out several times to ensure that results are
repeatable.
IMVU data analysis: This phase gives
meaning to the data that have been collected
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so that the research question can be answered.
Differential forensic analysis [15] is carried out
by comparing the collected data (snapshot)
before and after the experiments with IMVU
to observe the differences between them such
as report the files that have been added,
deleted, renamed, and altered, the difference
between Windows registry hive files. The
objective of the analysis is to understand the
changes and to determine if it contains any
relevant information or not. A taxonomy of
target artefacts is defined in order to guide and
structure subsequent forensic analysis. The
taxonomy used in our analysis is described in
[14].
IMVU FORENSICS: A
CASE STUDY
In our case study, we used computers with
network access (using a static IP address). The
testing was conducted using Windows 7
Enterprise, SP1. Besides, the monitoring tool
SysTracer was installed onto the system to
record file activity and changes made to the
Windows registry. Another computer was
setup as a man-in-the-middle proxy using
MITMproxy, running on the Ubuntu 14.04.1
LTS, this computer is used to monitor and
intercept network traffic as shown in Figure 1.
Next, an IMVU client program, version 514.0,
was installed. In order to use IMVU, firstly a
user has to create an account. For this case
study, we create three IMVU accounts
(InspectorAlgar, LadyElizabethSmall and
missycanaryyellow). We conduct different
conversations to create test data. The
conversations were in public rooms but also
limited by two participants. We created
moreover an AutoIt [16] script that simulated
an IMVU user. On beforehand a text file was
created containing the conversation text of one
of the discussion partners. A chat message was
send to the IMVU application within a fixed
(pre-adjustable) interval. By starting two
scripts on different machines in appropriate
time, we can simulate a chat conversation. The
chat messages contained the chat text and a
UNIX timestamp. An example from the chat
messages is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 1. MITM proxy setup
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Figure 2. Chat script usage example
IMVU: FILE SYSTEM
FORENSICS
In this section, we describe our forensic
acquisition results of IMVU file systems
including application file, log files, profile data
and location data.
Application Files
IMVU application files are stored in:
C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming
\IMVUClient\ folder. This path is fixed during
the installation. During the installation a
shortcut to IMVUQualityAgent.exe is added
into the Windows Start-up folder as well on
the user's desktop. We also found that IMVU
uses Mozilla's Gecko rendering engine and the
XML User Interface Language (XUL) for
building its user interface [17].
Besides, a configuration file imvu.cfg is
added into the user Flash Player Trust folder:
C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming
\Macromedia\FlashPlayer\#Security\FlashPla
yerTrust\. Configuration files inside this
FlashPlayerTrust folder normally contain a list
of directory paths. We also observe that
application shortcuts are added to IMVU
folder: C:\Users\%USERNAME%
\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start
Menu\Programs\IMVU\. We found moreover
the IMVU application is written in Python and
the compiled script files are stored in
library.zip: C:\Users\
%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\IMVUCli
ent\library.zip. We also decompiled these files
using Easy Python Decompiler and to explore
the IMVU application through reverse
engineering.
Log Files
IMVU log files are stored in C:\Users\
%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\IMVU\
folder including cpp.log,
IMVUQualityAgent.log, IMVULog.log, etc.
The cpp.log contains information related to
user interface and this file is created every time
the application starts. The
IMVUQualityAgent.log file is also created
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every time the application starts. It contains
‘application validation’ information and local
time stamp. Regarding to IMVULog.log file,
from the digital forensics examination point of
view, this file contains the most valuable
information. In fact, this log file is generated
by a round-robin process based on session and
file size. A new log file is created every time
the application starts. When the size of the log
file is greater than 2MB (2097152 bytes), this
process successively creates new files with the
same pathname as the first file, but with
different extensions started with ".1", ".2" and
so on. If it is greater than “.5”, the extension
restarts from “.1”, older files will be deleted.
Each record in IMVULog.log file contains the
following attributes (Figure 3):
1. The number of seconds since
start of application: Floating
point decimal value. The length is 6
characters minimum including the
dot and 3 decimals (milliseconds
rounded). If the length is less than
6, a leading 0 is added.
2. The thread id: String value,
minimum length 5 characters,
padded by spaces if necessary.
3. File name of the source file
where the logging call was
issued: String value, minimum
length 30 characters, padded by
spaces if necessary
4. Source line number where the
logging call was issued: Signed
integer decimal value, minimum
length 4 digits, padded by spaces if
necessary.
5. The logging level for the
message: String value, minimum
length 7 characters, padded by
spaces if necessary. Possible values
are
'DEBUG', 'INFO', 'WARNING', 'E
RROR', 'CRITICAL'.
6. The log message: String value.
Moreover, we notice that the maximum
length of an entire log record (attributes 1-6) is
512 characters. If the length exceeds 512
characters, it is truncated to the first 509
characters and three dots (‘…’) are added to
the end of the record. Besides, if the length of
the log message (attribute 6) is greater than a
defined length this log message is truncated
and three dots are also added to the end. We
have also observed that the log message
regarding to logging level ‘ERROR’, and
‘INFO’ consists of multiple lines, while other
log messages only contain a single line.
When analysing the log files, we noticed
that the IMVULog file also stores information
related to text communications. To analyse an
IMVU chat, it is necessary to understand the
following important aspects of a chat
conversation: (i) Who says what to whom; (ii)
In which chat session the conversation takes
place, note that an user can be present in
multiple rooms (chat sessions) at the ‘same’
time; (iii) Timestamp of the messages.
The text of a single message appears more
than once in different log records. Besides, in a
chat room, it is possible to have a private
conversation with just a single person in that
room (at least one of users is a VIP). Whisper
is a special feature available exclusively for
VIPs. A VIP member can whisper to anyone
and vice-versa, anyone can whisper to a VIP.
Two non-VIP users however cannot use this
feature to chat with each other. Moreover, the
log message contains a list of several elements.
The first element is the member id (‘userId’),
the second one is a chat id (‘chatId’) and the
last one contains dictionary data with keys and
values. The value ‘0’ of the key ‘to’ indicates
that the message was sent to the participant(s)
of a room. There are one or more participants
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in a room. The value of the key ‘message’
contains the actual chat message. We also note
that the value sometimes contains an asterisk
followed by a chat command. Besides, if the
message exceeds the maximum length, as
mentioned previously, it is truncated and three
dots are added to the end.
The value of the key ‘userId’ contains the
member id of the sender of the text message.
The value of the key ‘chatId’ contains a unique
id for each chat session. Concurrent chat
sessions in different rooms therefore have
different IDs. This log record does not contain
a timestamp. To determine the date and time
of the message for these log records, there are
two possibilities:
1. Calculate the approximate
timestamp using the number of
seconds since the start of the
application. This number is listed
at the beginning of the log record.
2. Combine it with the log records
derived from the file
SessionDispatcher.pyo.
User profile data
The IMVULog file only contains user profile
data when the status is ‘Running’ (i.e. the
application is running and the user is logged
in). The following information can be retrieved
from the user profile data: the user’s
avatarname associated with the IMVU
account, eight (8) asterisks of the user’s
password. Note that the real user password is
always replaced by eight asterisks. It is
independent on the actual length of the
password. Indeed, the most comprehensive
information can be retrieved from the multi-
line log message started with self.userInfo_
and followed by multiple lines of dictionary
(pairs of <key, value>) data.
The above information is based on the data
entered by the user (Account Settings) and
data allocated by IMVU. Besides, objects in
IMVU are identified by a unique id such as, for
example, Member ID, Room(Instance) ID,
Session ID, Product ID or Chat ID.
User authentication data
By investigating the Windows registry, we
found that IMVU authenticate users by using
username and password. The password is
stored in the registry if the option ‘Save
Password’ is selected. Indeed, the relevant
password can be retrieved from the registry
where it is stored as a hexadecimal Unicode
character notation. The user’s avatar name
associated with the IMVU account is also
present in the IMVULog file. The IMVULog
file also contains information about contacts
such as ‘Friends”, “Buddies” or “Fans”. Besides,
we also found that the buddystate.pyo script
implements the logging process.
Location data
There is limited information on location in the
user profile data as has been described in
Section 5.3, where the ‘country’ key referrers
to the geo-location of the IP address used and
‘country_code’ refers to the location specified
by the user in the profile settings. In the
IMVULog file the client and server IP
addresses are listed. When the system is
directly connected to the Internet and receives
an external Wide Area Network (WAN) public
IP address, this IP address is listed in the log
file.
IMVU INTERNAL
MEMORY FORENSICS
In this test, authors have explored the Python
source code to understand how log records are
buffered in memory. Whenever a record is
added into the buffer, a check is made to see
whether the buffer should be flushed to file or
not. In fact, the buffer is periodically flushed
whenever the buffer is full, or when an event of
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a certain severity happened. After making a
memory dump of a running system, authors
were able to retrieve log record data as
previously described above. Besides, because a
record consists of isolated fragments, it is
difficult to link the messages to a date and
time, a chat ID or the participants. IMVU also
creates a SQLite database in memory. Authors
were able to modify the source code and save
this database to hard disk. The database
consists of only a single table and contains
information about the HTTP cached files.
IMVU (log) files are nonvolatile and normally
available for investigation.
Authors were also able to retrieve the
IMVU password in clear text from memory,
even when the option ‘Save Password’ not was
used and therefore the password not could be
retrieved from the registry.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a forensic acquisition
process of IMVU apps for Windows. IM is one
of the most popular digital communication
technologies and widely used, but also being
exploited by criminals due to its popularity
and privacy features. So it is important that
we are able to collect artefacts of IM apps.
While most IM apps use a well-known
formatted history file (also known as IM log or
chat log) and there are tools available for
digital evidence collection, this is not the case
with IMVU. IMVU has a set of fixed number
log files that contain not only chat messages,
but also identifiable data. IMVU app also
deletes old log files when the number of log
files reaches a limit number. Forensic artefacts
can also be found in user profile data,
authenticated data and location data. Indeed,
we can also retrieve IMVU artifact from the
internal memory by explore its SQLite
databases.
We are working on the acquisition and
analysis more forensic artefacts of an IMVU
app such as registry information, network
traffic data and unallocated disk space. In the
case of analysing large amount of forensics
data, we also look at using data mining and
knowledge map techniques [18][19].
Figure 3. Partial IMVU.log file
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